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Abstract: The emergence of transaction cost economics (TCE) in the 
early 1970s with Oliver Williamson’s successful reconciliation of the so-
called neoclassical approach with Herbert Simon’s organizational theory 
can be considered an important part of the first cognitive turn in 
economics. The development of TCE until the late 1980s was 
particularly marked by treating the firm as an avoider of negative 
frictions, i.e., of transaction costs. However, since the 1990s TCE has 
been enriched by various approaches stressing the role of the firm in 
creating positive value, e.g., the literature on modularity. Hence, a 
second cognitive turn has taken place: the firm is no longer only seen as 
an avoider of negative costs but also as a creator of positive knowledge. 
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Transaction cost economics (TCE) has a long past since what we 
generally speak of as ‘transaction costs’ have been present in economic 
discourse for centuries. The past of TCE is rich in metaphors describing 
the idea of transaction costs, but the one with the most profound 
impact on the later development of TCE was the notion of frictions. That 
metaphor is strongly connected to the further metaphor of the market 
as a machine whose deviations from ideal functioning is characterized 
by frictions (e.g., Walras 1893). Therefore, the study of the past of TCE is 
guided by the study of its metaphors and particularly that of mechanical 
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friction. The past of TCE was not encapsulated in a particular research 
program, but rather in uncoordinated attempts to give the elementary 
idea of “costly exchange” an operational counterpart.1 
For centuries that elementary idea had been conceptualized as just 
costs of transportation (e.g., Aristotle’s Politics and Smith’s Wealth of 
nations).2 Then, in the nineteenth century, Menger introduced the 
concept of friction into his Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre where 
it stands for various difficulties in the process of price formation. The 
growing popularity of the friction metaphor made it a useful concept for 
explaining given theoretical model’s failures—economists simply 
introduced frictions (Klaes 2000a). That was the case for example in 
monetary economics at the beginning of the twentieth century, when 
economists considered why people hold onto cash rather than profitable 
assets. 
It was John Hicks who first disagreed with general friction-based 
explanations: “The most obvious sort of friction, and undoubtedly one 
of the most important, is the cost of transferring assets from one form 
to another” (Hicks 1935, 6). Subsequently, in 1940, Tibor Scitovsky 
introduced the label of ‘transaction costs’ into the economic vocabulary 
(Hardt 2006). In the meantime Ronald Coase published his 1937 paper 
in which he attributed the existence of the firm to the cost of using the 
price mechanism (Coase 1937, 390). 
It should be clear therefore, that TCE, understood as the study of the 
economic consequences of “costly exchange”, existed a long time before 
becoming a research program within the framework of economics. It has 
a long past but as a science it has a short history.3 That history began in 
the 1970s with the work of Oliver Williamson. The first appearance of 
the term ‘transaction cost economics’ was in the title of Williamson’s 
article in 1979, “Transaction cost economics: the governance of 
contractual relations” in the Journal of Law and Economics and, as far as 
the study of transaction costs usually leads to the study of institutions, 
                                                 
1 I use the term ‘research program’ in the entire article not in a strict Lakatosian sense, 
but merely as a theory or a set of theories developed in order to solve particular 
problems (for a further discussion, see the final paragraph of the forth section). 
2 The term ‘elementary idea’ is used here in the sense of Lovejoy (1982), namely as an 
idea present in various historical époques and in different cultures. Treating 
transaction costs as an elementary idea leads us to the conclusion that it is of crucial 
importance for economics as a whole, since “the number of essentially distinct 
philosophical [here: economic] ideas is decidedly limited” (Lovejoy 1982, 4). 
3 A reconstruction of the past of TCE can be found in Klaes 2000a; 2000b; 2001a. 
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he is also the father of the term ‘new institutional economics’, in 
Markets and hierarchies, 1975. 
As it is indicated in the title of this article, my goal here is to 
reconstruct the history of TCE: the approach within economic theory 
emerging from Williamson’s contributions in the 1970s. Since “[...] in 
order to evaluate the past [history] properly the historian of science 
must know the present” (Bachelard 1951, 9), I will try to find a 
theoretical bridge between the history of TCE—particularly of its 
emergence (the Williamsonian TCE of the 1970s)—and its recent 
developments. Consequently, I reconstruct the rise of Williamsonian 
TCE and claim that his approach, lying at the intersection of economics 
and organization, is to a great extent responsible for the first cognitive 
turn in economics: namely the limited transformation of the so-called 
mainstream economics (henceforth, ME) due to the study of economic 
activity as undertaken by agents characterized by limited cognitive 
capacity.4 
First the character of Williamsonian TCE is analyzed and it is argued 
that what distinguishes his theory is his treating the firm as an avoider 
of negative (transaction costs). The underlying logic of the development 
of TCE can be described as a move from treating the firm as an avoider 
of negative (costs) towards conceptualizing the firm as a creator of 
positive (knowledge). I show that this was due to the (re)introduction of 
knowledge related problems into the realm of TCE following the 
incorporation of those elements of Simon’s legacy which did not enter 
TCE in the 1970s.5 
I describe this late incorporation of some elements of the Carnegie 
legacy as a second cognitive turn in TCE. Interestingly, as the first 
cognitive turn allowed for the limited incorporation of TCE into 
economic orthodoxy, the second one moved TCE back towards economic 
                                                 
4 I define here mainstream economics simply as orthodox economic thought. For the 
purposes of this paper heterodoxy is understood as non-orthodoxy, where orthodoxy 
denotes the research perspective based on the framework of maximizing behavior. The 
further a given theoretical approach is from a maximizing (or cost-minimizing) 
framework, the more heterodox it is. 
5 The inveteracy of knowledge issues is an important distinguishing feature of modern 
TCE as opposed to the Williamsonian approach of the 1970s. In that sense TCE is not 
just one of many approaches dealing with the issue of incomplete information. If we 
treat information just as “data organized into a meaningful pattern”, then even in the 
situation of possessing perfect information we may still have imperfect knowledge 
(treating knowledge as “information with a layer of intellectual analysis”, e.g., beliefs 
about causality, see Hislop 2005, 16). That is why limited cognitive capacity leads to 
imperfect knowledge even in the presence of perfect information. 
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heterodoxy (Groenewegen and Vromen 1996). In other words, recent 
TCE literature can be seen as a more “new institutional” approach than 
was the case for Williamson’s early writings, described by Dugger (1983, 
96) as just “a more realistic and sophisticated neoclassicism”. The 
closeness of recent TCE to “new institutionalism” is mainly due to the 
fact that nowadays its research apparatus is only partially built on the 
“economizing on transaction costs” principle. In that sense TCE, I claim, 
is more heterodox than in the early 1970s.6 
 
THE FIRST COGNITIVE TURN: THE EMERGENCE OF TCE 
While the term ‘transaction costs’ appeared in the economic literature 
relatively late, the notion of ‘transaction cost economics’ entered into 
economics even later, that is, in the work of Oliver Williamson from the 
late 1970s. Before that, the approach emerging from Coase’s (1937) “The 
nature of the firm” was described as transaction cost reasoning, 
transactional paradigm or transaction cost approach. Surprisingly, even 
in his now classic papers from the early 1970s Williamson did not use 
the term ‘transaction cost economics’. For Williamson the transaction 
cost approach was at that time outside the domain of mainstream 
economics, namely the orthodox economics based on the work of Arrow 
and Debreu.  
In Markets and hierarchies, Williamson expresses his doubts about 
the place of transaction cost reasoning within economic theory as 
follows: “Whether such an approach qualifies as economics is 
problematic” (1975, 248). A few years later he adds: “[...] the origins of 
transaction cost theory must be sought in influences and motives that 
lie outside the normal domain of economics” (Williamson 1981b, 1538). 
In other words, in the economics built on the general equilibrium 
framework any attempt to incorporate transaction costs into the realm 
of ME would be treated as a heresy, and the term ‘transaction cost 
economics’ would seem an oxymoron. 
In the 1970s, however, something had changed in ME: economic 
theory started to become more pluralistic again (as it had been in the 
1920s and the 1930s).7 On the one hand, many economists failed in their 
attempts to build a “whole” economic theory on the general equilibrium 
                                                 
6 See Hodgson 1993, 12. 
7 I use the word ‘pluralistic’ here in a broad sense, namely that economics started to be 
rich in various theories (plurality of theories) and that economists gradually started to 
treat the growing plurality of theories as a positive phenomenon. See also Mäki 1997. 
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framework, e.g., because of the impossibility of formulating the so-
called microfoundations of macroeconomics—the implication of the 
Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem (Sent 2006). On the other hand, 
the introduction of transaction costs into the world of Arrow-Debreu 
resulted in claims such as that “[...] different social arrangements result 
in different transaction technologies purely as a result of legal ways of 
protecting property rights” (Kurz 1974, 4), i.e., that the set of possible 
transaction opportunities depends on the institutional framework of the 
economy. Consequently, ME has been transformed into various 
complementary approaches based on game theory, bounded rationality, 
experimental methods, and last but not least transaction cost 
reasoning.8 In the late 1970s putting the term ‘transaction cost’ together 
with the word ‘economics’ became not only possible, but also desirable. 
The long past of TCE was over, and the history of TCE had begun. 
This section is organized as follows. First, the emergence of 
Williamsonian TCE, described as the first cognitive turn in economics, is 
reconstructed. Then, in a second subsection, his theory is presented, 
focusing on his conceptualization of a firm as an avoider of negatives.  
 
The rise of Williamsonian TCE 
In the 1950s and 1960s the neoclassical theory of the firm started to be 
widely criticized for its unrealistic assumptions. The assumption of 
profit maximization was questioned as well as that of a firm’s perfect 
information about market conditions. Katona (1951) claimed, for 
instance, that firms do not maximize profits, but act in order to satisfy 
managers’ various ambitions. In the same way, argued Papandreou 
(1952), firms just maximize a so-called “general preference function”, 
which aggregates the individual aspirations of members of an 
organization. Rothschild (1947) went even further and claimed that a 
firm’s raison d’être is just to survive. Others did not reject the 
importance of making profits, but instead of the pure profit 
maximization assumption they preferred to talk about achieving 
satisfactory profits (e.g., Gordon 1948; Margolis 1958). 
Such critique of the neoclassical theory of the firm opened up the 
black box of the Marshallian representative firm and shifted economists’ 
focus of attention towards the study of the internal structure of the 
                                                 
8 I do not claim here that the so-called degeneration or in other words great 
transformation of economics was only due to the two above mentioned facts. For an 
in-depth study of the reasons for the growing pluralism within ME, see Sent 2006; 
Colander, et al. 2004.  
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firm. Consequently, two kinds of theories emerged: those dealing with 
the issue of designing an incentive structure within the firm that would 
maximize the firm’s chances of surviving in the market (e.g., Bernard 
1938; Simon, et al. 1950); and an approach focusing on the issue of 
decision making within organizations, which took its origin from 
cognitive psychology (e.g., Simon 1957a). What links these two kinds of 
theories is a departure from the perfect rationality assumption and its 
replacement by the claim that individuals are characterized by bounded 
rationality: “[they] are intentionally rational, but only to a limited extent” 
(Simon 1957b, xxiv). Economic man is substituted by organizational man 
with limited computational and cognitive capacity (Simon 1978). For 
Herbert Simon the key to understanding the functioning of the economy 
is an analysis of the decision making process: 
 
The most important data that could lead us to an understanding of 
economic processes and to empirically sound theories of them 
reside inside human minds. Accordingly, we must seek to discover 
what went on in the heads of those who made the relevant decision 
(Simon 1997, 70-71). 
 
Simon’s research, particularly his concept of bounded rationality, 
had a profound impact on other economists working at Carnegie, and 
made the rapid development of organizational theory and behavioral 
economics possible. Two important features of research in the area of 
organizational theory undertaken at Carnegie were its interdisciplinary 
character and concern with empirical problems. Richard Cyert, one of 
the main proponents of behavioral economics at Carnegie, describes the 
character of the economic theory developed at Carnegie in the 1950s 
and the 1960s as follows: 
 
If you are doing behavioral economics you have to think about actual 
behavior and you also have to have the ability to move to the field of 
organization theory, and to borrow ideas from other fields too, such 
as psychology [...]. On the theoretical level it is important to learn to 
deal with bounded rationality and uncertainty. You have to deal with 
the real world (Interview with Cyert, in: Augier and March, 2002, 6). 
 
The above statement by Cyert may suggest that economics at 
Carnegie was quite heterodox and was in opposition to ME, but that was 
not the case. One should note that apart from the behaviorist group 
there was also a strong ME group dealing with issues such as rational 
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expectations and the theory of effective markets (for example, Franco 
Modigliani, John Muth, Merton Miller, Allan Meltzer, and later also 
Robert Lucas, Thomas Sargent, and Edward Prescott). Due to the 
relatively small number of economists at Carnegie, people from the two 
groups exchanged ideas and they quite often had very heated debates 
(Klaes 2001b). That intellectual atmosphere made Carnegie “an 
incredible place at which to be a student” says Oliver Williamson, a 
graduate student at the Graduate School of Administration at Carnegie 
in the late 1960s. In an interview from 1988 he adds: 
 
The Carnegie experience was extraordinary. I really enjoyed it [...], it 
was just such an interesting place to be. Interdisciplinary work was 
going on [which] included a good deal of work in organization 
theory [...]. I especially found the intersection of economics and 
organization fascinating, and I felt that there would be a lot of 
research opportunities here (Williamson 1990, 117). 
 
Williamson’s PhD dissertation entitled The economics of 
discretionary behavior: managerial objectives in a theory of the firm is 
situated just at the intersection of economics and organization: 
 
[...] although the objective function of the firm was reformulated in 
favor of realism in motivation, I worked out of a maximization 
rather than a satisficing setup. The dissertation therefore reflected 
some of the tensions between behavioral economics and orthodoxy 
(Williamson 1996, 150). 
 
The research strategy of Oliver Williamson was to use the behavioral 
assumptions of organizational theory combined with the quantitative 
and marginal analytical framework of neoclassical economics (Allen 
1999). The following statement by Williamson from “Hierarchical control 
and optimum firm size” clearly summarizes his research strategy: 
 
The strategy of borrowing behavioral assumptions from the 
organization theory literature and developing the implications of the 
behavior observed within the framework of economic analysis would 
seem to be one which might find application quite generally. 
Combining these two research areas so as to secure access to the 
strengths of each would thus appear to be quite promising 
(Williamson 1967, 135). 
 
For Williamson, the theories and concepts of organization theory 
literature including those of Simon’s behavioral economics were related 
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to the analysis of individual decision making and hence had a very 
microeconomic character. However, the majority of organization 
theory’s concepts were defined so broadly that it was nearly impossible 
to use them in empirical research. It became evident for Williamson that 
there was a need to translate the behavioral concepts of Carnegie into 
the language of economics (Simon 1997, 38). 
In the late 1960s Williamson tried to explicate the rationale for 
vertical integration, but he could not find the answer within the 
framework of ME. That question is similar to the one posed by Coase in 
“The nature of the firm”, but the answer given by Williamson is slightly 
different from that of Coase. Although Williamson was deeply convinced 
that the existence of market exchange costs was important for 
explaining the emergence of firms, “[he] was not persuaded of the 
possibilities inherent in the transaction cost approach” (Williamson 
1990, 117). Then, while preparing a series of seminars on the theory of 
vertical integration requested by Julius Margolis, he discovered that the 
reasons for integration lie in the behavioral characteristic of contracting 
actors and first of all in bounded rationality:  
 
Bounded rationality is one of them. I don’t know if I defined 
opportunism at the time, but we focused on two critical issues which 
are close to opportunism, namely limitations associated with 
promises and the fact that some promises need institutional support 
(Williamson 1990, 118). 
 
Consequently, the problem of opportunistic behavior combined with 
that of bounded rationality arising in the situation of bilateral monopoly 
(small-numbers exchange) and uncertainty emerged as the defining 
features of his analytical framework. Subsequently, Williamson 
translated ideas from organization literature into concepts observable in 
the functioning of firms and markets: Simonian bounded rationality 
gave a theoretical foundation for formulating the idea of incomplete 
contracts and opportunism, and the search theories of Cyert and March 
(1964)—e.g., myopic search, trial-and-error learning, and local search— 
enabled Williamson to develop the concept of “feasible foresight”. Next, 
he combined that conceptual framework with the “classical” assumption 
of neoclassical economics, namely that of cost minimization. The 
emerging transaction cost economics, here described also as 
Williamsonian TCE, followed. The first paper in which he used that 
framework was “The vertical integration of production: market failure 
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considerations” (1971). Twenty years after its publication he says: “I 
really feel, at the time when I wrote the paper, that I cracked the 
problem. This was obviously a certain exaggeration. But I did have a 
sense that this reformulation [of concepts] really got to some of the 
basic issues” (Williamson 1990, 119). 
The organizational theory of Carnegie was the first attempt within 
(broadly defined) economics of building a connection between 
(cognitive) psychology and (old behavioral) economics (Sent 2004, 739-
740). That was possible mainly due to Simon’s contribution to the so-
called cognitive revolution: the successful attempt to bring 
psychological insights into the realm of economic theory and 
simultaneously to limit the role of behaviorism.9 But still, organizational 
researchers at Carnegie remained quite dissatisfied with mainstream 
economics. Simon, for instance, left the Carnegie Graduate School of 
Industrial Administration in the 1970s for the psychology department 
of the same university, noting: “My economist friends have long since 
given up on me, consigning me to psychology or some other distant 
wasteland” (Simon 1991, 385). 
Sent (2004) even claims that due to its distance from ME the 
organizational theory of Carnegie had a very limited impact on 
economic theory of the 1960s and 1970s; however, the emergence of 
Williamsonian TCE proves the contrary. There is no doubt that TCE had 
a profound impact on the state of economic theory in the 1970s, and 
that it is partly responsible for its current plurality. Moreover, there is 
no doubt that the rise of TCE in the 1970s was only possible due to the 
Carnegie revolution of the incorporation of psychological concepts into 
economics. In that sense, Carnegie, by making the rise of TCE possible, 
played an important role in transforming ME, and hence the rise of TCE 
can be treated as the first cognitive turn in economics.  
 
The firm as an avoider of negatives in Williamsonian TCE 
Every theory of the firm must answer the following question: why do 
firms exist? (Holmstrom and Tirole 1989, 165). According to Williamson, 
firms emerge when making transactions internally (within the firm) is 
                                                 
9 One should note that the cognitive turn described here can be treated as an 
important step in the process of enriching economics with various ideas from the 
cognitive sciences. That turn is more advanced than “[...] the cognitive (half-) turn made 
at Cowles” (Mirowski 2001, 451), because the “(half-) turn” was mainly due to the 
incorporation of informational issues into the realm of economics (e.g., Marschak’s 
work), and not the knowledge ones, as in the case of Simon’s contributions. 
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cheaper than externally (on the market). That is similar to Coase’s now 
famous statement that “the main reason why it is profitable to establish 
a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price 
mechanism” (1937, 390); however, in “The nature of the firm” we do not 
find an in-depth analysis of the reasons for the positive costs of market 
exchange. Coase (1937) writes about “the cost of discovering what the 
relevant prices are”, and “the cost of negotiating and concluding a 
separate contract”, but does not elaborate extensively on these 
concepts, nor give any operational measures of transaction costs. 
Moreover, in his 1937 paper he does not study the interplay between 
institutions and transaction costs: 
 
[…] as I came to realize when I wrote “The problem of social cost”, 
all these interrelationships [between institutions and transaction 
costs] are affected by the state of law, which also needs to be taken 
into account in the analysis. But it is a theoretical scheme that 
incorporates these interrelationships that I believe will make my 
approach in “The nature of the firm” operational (Coase 1993a, 73). 
 
Williamson goes a step further and offers a complex and rather 
complete analysis of the determinants of the mode of making 
transactions. First, he claims that: 
 
[...] the advantages of integration thus are not that technological 
(flow process) economies are unavailable to nonintegrated firms, but 
that integration harmonizes interests (or reconciles differences, 
often by fiat) and permits an efficient (adaptive, sequential) decision 
making process (Williamson 1971, 117).  
 
Thus, economizing on transaction costs matters for selecting a given 
way of contracting. Although his work from the early 1970s was 
stimulated by empirical research, his papers from that period were of 
purely theoretical character. His aim was to build a conceptual 
framework which only later could be used as a tool in empirical 
research. The purpose of his subsequent articles (1971; 1973; 1975; 
1979) was to conceptualize the interplay between various factors 
responsible for vertical integration.  
 
This was done in my article “Transaction cost economics: the 
governance of contractual arrangements” [...]. I think this is a key 
article [...]. This effort to so to speak “dimensionalize transactions” 
seemed to me at that time and since as an important step on the 
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road of operationalizing this whole line of study (Williamson 1990, 
120). 
 
Although Williamson’s 1979 paper shows the impact of asset 
specificity on the choice of organizational form, it does not elaborate on 
the interplay between the imperative of transaction costs minimization 
and the neoclassical rule of optimizing the size of production activity 
(economizing on production costs). In other words, he does not 
conceptualize the relation between asset specificity and the total 
production costs—neoclassical production costs plus transaction 
costs—(Menard 2007). That was due to his negligence of technological 
issues: “concentrating on the study of transaction technology resulted in 
disregarding the role of production technology” (Williamson 1988, 361).  
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s he re-discovered the role of 
production technology in defining the mode of making transactions and 
hence the concept of asset specificity: naturally related to production 
technology, started to play a dominant role in the explanans of his 
theory. In his 1981 paper he writes: 
 
If assets are nonspecific, markets enjoy advantages in both 
production cost and governance cost respects: static scale 
economies can be more fully exhausted by buying instead of making; 
markets can also aggregate uncorrelated demands, thereby realizing 
risk-pooling benefits; and external procurement avoids many of the 
hazards to which internal procurement is subject. As assets become 
more specific, however, the aggregation benefits of markets in the 
first two respects are reduced and exchange takes on a progressively 
stronger bilateral character (Williamson 1981a, 558). 
 
Simply speaking, Williamsonian TCE treats the firm as an avoider of 
negatives (Conner 1991). First, as an avoider of high exchange costs on 
the market. Second, as an avoider of the risks resulting from the hold-
up problem. Third, as an avoider of opportunistic market relations. 
Since at the heart of Williamsonian TCE there is an assumption that “the 
same production activities can be carried on either within the firm or by 
a collection of autonomous contractors—that is except for problems of 
opportunism, the same inputs can be used equally productively in a 
firm or a market context” (Conner 1991, 142).  
It is really hard to see here the firm as a creator of any positive 
value. That is contrary to earlier views of the firm such as that of the 
resource based literature that claimed that firm specific assets are more 
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productive inside than outside the firm (e.g., Wernerfelt 1984). In the 
Williamsonian framework, if we do not have any opportunism, then any 
resource can be used with the same productivity within or outside the 
firm. Going even further, one could say that in the situation of the non-
existence of opportunism, there would not be any reason for the 
emergence of the firm, but the actual nature of economic systems 
proves the contrary: firms emerge even when one cannot identify any 
opportunistic behavior. 
The reason why Williamson treats the firm as an avoider of negatives 
lies in the fact that economists of organization focus their attention 
only on the role of the firm in constraining rent-seeking behavior 
resulting from imperfect knowledge (Langlois and Foss 1997, 6). They 
do not elaborate on the role of the firm in productive rent-seeking, 
namely the more efficient use of knowledge. “Economists have neglected 
the benefit side of alternative organizational structures; for reasons of 
history and technique, they have allocated most of their resources to the 
cost side” (Langlois and Foss 1997, 6). 
In his early literature on TCE, Williamson concentrated on the issue 
of coordination: firms emerge in order to facilitate cooperation between 
various production inputs. In other words, firms materialize in order to 
avoid the market costs of coordination which are quite high in the case 
of boundedly rational agents confronting uncertainty. 
 
If, in consideration of these [cognitive] limits [resulting from 
bounded rationality], it is very costly or impossible to identify future 
contingencies and specify, ex ante, appropriate adaptations thereto, 
long-term contracts may be supplanted by internal organization [...]. 
Internal organization in this way economizes on the bounded 
rationality attributes of decision makers in circumstances in which 
prices are not “sufficient statistics” and uncertainty is substantial 
(Williamson 1975, 9). 
 
Williamson summarizes his research strategy as follows: “A useful 
strategy for explicating the decision to integrate is to hold technology 
constant across alternative modes of organization and to neutralize 
obvious sources of differential economic benefit” (Williamson 1985, 88). 
So, in his work from the 1970s and the 1980s he neglected the role of 
firm-specific knowledge, i.e., the positive capabilities of a firm. He 
assumed that knowledge could be equally well transmitted between 
parties transacting on the market and those transacting internally. That 
claim is related to the ME assumption that firm behaviour—e.g., profit 
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maximization—is invariant to its institutional form—e.g., ownership 
structure—(Foss, et al. 1999, 632). In the next section, I show that a 
departure from that very assumption of Williamsonian TCE opens the 
door for a new kind of theory of the firm in which an enterprise is 
treated as a creator of positive value. 
 
THE SECOND COGNITIVE TURN 
I have shown already that the first cognitive turn in economics was 
associated with the work of Simon and others from Carnegie. The role of 
TCE in this turn was to offer a link between neoclassical economics and 
cognitive psychology combined with Carnegie’s organizational theory, 
e.g., TCE popularized the concept of bounded rationality in ME (Foss 
2003).10 In that sense, TCE played a significant role in making the 
economics of the 1970s more diversified. However, it did not 
incorporate into its explanans all the concepts and theories of the 
economics of information and cognitive psychology: “Williamson has 
taken only part of Simon’s argument on board” (Hodgson 1993, 11).  
TCE, for instance, neglects the role of knowledge formation and 
sharing in defining the way transactions are organized. Williamson’s 
contributions from the 1970s implicitly assumed that knowledge can be 
equally well shared on the market and within the firm. It should be 
noted that even in the pre-Williamsonian theory many claimed that 
knowledge can be more easily transmitted within the firm (Malmgren 
1961). That is due to the fact that knowledge often has a tacit nature 
and needs a stable environment to be efficiently shared: “the more often 
a particular transaction is made the more information the firm may 
have about that transaction” (Malmgren 1961, 414). That is not the case 
in anonymous market transactions. Such ways of understanding the 
economic role of the firm (half-) opened the door for theories 
conceptualizing the firm as a creator of positive value. 
The introduction of knowledge issues into various theories of the 
firm, including TCE, has transformed the treatment of firms in 
economics (Grant 1996). For Williamson the way transactions are 
organized depends on asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of 
                                                 
10 An interesting explanation of why Williamson built a “link” between ME and Simon’s 
approach is offered by Pessali (2006). He uses a rhetorical analysis to show that the 
goal of Williamson was to persuade an ME audience to take his theory seriously and 
thus he had to relate TCE to their beliefs (Pessali 2006, 48). That is why, in his opinion, 
Williamsonian TCE shares some fundamental assumptions with ME (e.g., cost 
minimization). 
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contracting. When the focus is on knowledge, the three pillars of 
Williamsonian TCE do not offer a sufficient basis for predicting the 
emerging organizational form. It is quite intuitive that in the case of 
interactions rich in knowledge special governance structures should 
emerge. In the beginning of the 1990s it became evident that in a 
modern economy what really matters are the knowledge transactions 
(e.g., Starbuck 1992; for the study of knowledge intensive firms). But the 
way transactions are conceptualized in TCE is “at best incomplete for 
the purpose of treating knowledge transactions” (Foss 2006, 18). 
According to Winter (1987), knowledge transactions can be 
conceptualized in terms of the characteristics of the underlying 
knowledge. Following from this, he offers four dimensions of knowledge 
transactions: tacitness versus explicitness, system quality versus stand-
alone, teachability versus non-teachability, and complexity versus non-
complexity. What follows is the so-called knowledge governance 
approach (KGA) which focuses on the problem of how to organize 
transactions to efficiently generate knowledge and capabilities 
(Nickerson and Zenger 2004, 617). 
In the Coasian terminology a firm is an “island of conscious power in 
the ocean of market transactions” (Coase 1937, 5), and the reason for 
the existence of such islands is to economize on transaction costs. If we 
are to use the terminology of KGA, and particularly of the modularity 
literature, one can describe the process of firm formation as putting the 
interactions (transactions) within a single module: more precisely, a firm 
is a set of interactions (processes) that cannot be decomposed. A 
standard example, noted by Simon (1962, 470), is of the Tempus, a 
traditional Swiss watchmaker, who manufactured all the parts of a 
watch single-handedly without using any subassemblies supplied by 
external firms. The main reason for that specific way of organizing the 
production process is in the character of the underlying knowledge 
which is mainly of a tacit (subjective) nature. According to Langlois, “the 
firm exists because it offers a special kind of information exchange that 
somehow generates more knowledge than the ‘sum’ of the knowledge of 
participating individuals” (Langlois 2002, 34), and consequently, 
contrary to Williamsonian and Coasian tradition: 
 
Firms arise as islands of nonmodularity in a sea of modularity. They 
may do so in response to externalities arising from the likes of team 
production or asset specificity. More interestingly, firms may also 
arise in order to generate externalities, that is, to facilitate the 
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communication of rich information for purposes of qualitative 
coordination, innovation, and remodularization (Langlois 2002, 34). 
 
Consequently, “firms exist because they provide a social 
communication of voluntaristic action structured by organizing 
principles that are not reducible to individuals” (Kogut and Zander 
1992, 384). In the presence of knowledge rich environments what is 
needed for effective knowledge sharing is a common language and 
powerful incentives. The KGA perspective still falls within the 
framework of TCE because its unit of analysis is still the transaction, but 
now this is a knowledge transaction, and due to the very nature of 
knowledge (e.g., its cumulative character, tacit nature, and public good 
characteristics) the explanans of TCE has to be enriched.11 Since, 
according to the KGA approach, managers first choose valuable 
problems, and then the organizational mechanism that efficiently 
governs search (i.e., the search for knowledge), the character of a given 
problem is an important factor in determining the organizational choice. 
It should be noted here that the explanandum of TCE is still the same, 
i.e., at the heart of TCE is the question of how particular transactions 
should be organized. 
If we have a decomposable problem (e.g, building a high-
performance PC can be decomposed into manufacturing a high-speed 
processor, disk, and so on), the quality of the solution depends very 
little on interactions between knowledge sets (e.g., between the 
knowledge of the processor manufacturer and the knowledge of the 
hard disk manufacturer), and hence ‘directional search’ is best. 
Directional search is a search through trial and error, e.g., we put a given 
processor and a hard disk together and check whether we get a more 
efficient computer or not. 
The contrary holds for non-decomposable problems, i.e., problems 
with intense interactions between knowledge sets such that knowledge 
sets cannot be separated into sub-problems, e.g., manufacturing a 
computer processor itself. In such cases, “an actor familiar with a 
particular technology cannot predictably enhance the value of the 
product design based solely on the knowledge he or she possesses” 
(Nickerson and Zenger 2004, 620). In this case ‘heuristic search’ is best, 
i.e., “trials are thus selected based on a cognitive map or implicit theory 
of how knowledge sets and specific design choices relevant to the 
                                                 
11 For an in-depth analysis of the characteristics of knowledge, see Foray 2004. 
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problem interact to determine solution performance” (Nickerson and 
Zenger 2004, 621). 
Therefore, when problems are non-decomposable, searching best 
takes place within the firm, and when they are decomposable the market 
will be a more efficient machine for organizing searching. In this 
approach the firm is able to produce valuable knowledge (or, in other 
words, to solve valuable problems). The language of Nickerson and 
Zenger’s theory is taken from the work of Simon, e.g., the concept of 
non-decomposable problems was introduced by Simon (1962). The late 
incorporation of these ideas into TCE is due to the fact that these 
concepts needed a designation—knowledge—which the TCE of the 
1970s was not sufficiently focused on. Thus, the incorporation of 
Simon’s legacy into the theory of TCE took nearly thirty years. From this 
perspective the move from TCE defining the firm as an avoider of 
negatives towards the view of the firm as a creator of positives is not 
due to the incorporation into TCE of a totally new set of theories or 
concepts but rather to a more complete assimilation of the Carnegie 
legacy. Consequently, this transformation of TCE is considered here as 
its second cognitive turn because defining the economic role of the firm 
in a positive sense has radically changed the explanans of TCE. 
It should be noted also that the growing importance of knowledge 
issues in TCE is related indirectly to the emergence of the new 
behavioral economics (associated with the work of Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman) which deals with various sorts of cognitive biases 
characteristic of contracting agents (Foss 2001a, 221). One way of 
mitigating these biases is to use an appropriate organizational form: 
“[...] organization is not merely a problem [...], but organization is often 
a solution” (Williamson 1998, 1). A good example is the so-called 
availability heuristic which states that people tend to overestimate the 
probabilities of events they have experienced in the past. Consequently, 
people individually tend to make systematic errors in risk assessments. 
However, when put together within the framework of a firm, they start 
to estimate risk in more objective ways thanks to those different 
individual experiences. Thus, by employing a specific organizational 
form (the firm), the negative effects of the biases caused by the 
availability heuristic can be reduced.12 
This second cognitive turn in TCE also follows the development of 
so-called cognitive economics, for which: 
                                                 
12 For more examples, see Foss 2001b. 
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Cognition is not only about learning processes in the human brain, 
but also about external knowledge storage devices, asymmetric 
distribution of knowledge between individuals and the organization 
of communication between them (Martens 2004, 7). 
 
Since the concern of cognitive economics is with extending the 
cognitive capacity of individuals, the emergence of various 
organizational forms can be treated as the result of “[...] the 
evolutionary search for ever more cognitive economy” (Martens 2004, 
10). Consequently, the need for overcoming the limited cognitive 
capacity of individuals has come to be seen as an important rationale 
for the existence of the firm and a significant factor in determining its 
organizational form. 
Last but not least, we should note here that this understanding of a 
second cognitive turn in TCE is reinforced by the nearly simultaneous 
growth of the knowledge management (KM) literature. That research 
agenda takes its roots from Bell’s (1973) seminal book The coming of 
post-industrial society, in which Bell argues that the post-industrial 
society is built upon knowledge rather than things (Hislop 2005, 4). In a 
similar vein, the role of knowledge in contemporary society and in 
management practice was described by Peter Drucker: “The basic 
economic resource [...] is no longer capital, nor natural resources, nor 
labor [...] It is and will be knowledge” (Drucker 1993, 7). 
Knowledge based goods and services have replaced industrial 
products, and hence the focus of management literature has moved 
from analyzing production processes towards analyzing knowledge 
transfer and creation. This becomes evident when we analyze the 
content of the leading management journals: e.g., in 1990 one can find 
less than 20 KM articles, but in 1998 there were nearly 170 (Scarbrough 
and Swan 2001, 6).  
Since the role of the firm is to produce and transfer knowledge, the 
KM literature analyses the organizational structures of firms that 
facilitate these processes. Interestingly, the main research questions of 
the KM literature are closely related to those of the KGA approach 
described above. The claim that knowledge processes can be influenced 
by governance mechanisms integrates the KM literature and 
contemporary TCE, and hence reinforces the trend towards theorizing 
the firm as a creator of positives, in particular of knowledge. 
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THE CONTINUITY OF TCE 
Our discussion of the transformation of TCE would be incomplete 
without some methodological reflection on the continuity between the 
Williamsonian approach and more recent developments in the TCE 
literature. Is it possible to claim, for instance, that the KGA approach 
still lies within the now broadly defined TCE? That question touches 
upon the issue of what constitutes the very essence of TCE reasoning. 
Three arguments for continuity seem compelling. 
First, the crucial element of TCE’s explanandum is still the question 
of how to organize particular transactions in order to achieve the best 
possible outcomes. Although the second cognitive turn in TCE has 
transformed TCE’s explanans (i.e., we now consider more factors 
responsible for organizational choice), its explanandum is relatively 
untouched. 
Second, the TCE transformed by the second cognitive turn still 
conceptualizes transaction activity as a human undertaking which takes 
place in a particular institutional framework. In other words, without 
institutional infrastructure making transactions would be impossible, 
and therefore the study of institutions matters. The analysis of the 
interplay between transaction costs and institutions is present in 
Williamsonian TCE and also in more recent theories, e.g. the modularity 
approach and KGA. Although transaction costs are conceptualized 
differently in various TCE branches, the essential meaning of that 
concept is the same and relates to an elementary idea describing a 
crucial characteristic feature of human action, namely that exchange is 
not a zero cost activity. Understanding the economic rationale behind 
broadly defined costly exchange motivated Coase’s 1937 paper, 
Williamsonian contributions from the 1970s, and is still at the heart of 
TCE’s research agenda. In Lovejoy’s terms variations in the meaning of 
‘transaction costs’ result from the fact that it is a “recurrent unit [idea] 
in many contexts” (Lovejoy 1982, 17), and also from the fact that TCE is 
such a diversified research program.  
Third, it should be stressed that although Lakatos’s ‘research 
programmes’ methodology has turned out to be of little use in analyzing 
the issue of overall scientific progress in economics, it can still be a 
reasonable perspective from which to study the structure of a given 
scientific program (Hands 2001, 287). Even if we do not treat TCE as a 
pure scientific research program in the Lakatosian sense, we can 
identify the hard-core’s characteristics that are present in both 
HARDT / THE HISTORY OF TRANSACTION COSTS ECONOMICS 
ERASMUS JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 47 
Williamsonian TCE and in more recent TCE, i.e., the assumption of 
bounded rationality, the notion of imperfect information, and the 
imperative of economizing on transaction costs. Consequently, and in 
contrast to Groenewegen and Vromen’s (1996) opinion, it seems 
plausible that a more pluralistic theory of economic organization can be 
built within, and not outside, the domain of TCE. The above-described 
second cognitive turn in TCE is an important step towards such a 
theory. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In a paper aimed at reconstructing the development of TCE, Ronald 
Coase claims the following: “It is clear to me that Williamson’s influence 
has been immense. In a real sense, transaction cost economics, through 
his writing and teaching, is his creation” (Coase 1993b, 98). However, as 
I showed briefly in the introduction, TCE is not only due to the work of 
Williamson, but also to various attempts to conceptualize the idea of 
“costly exchange”. But Coase is certainly right in underlining the role of 
Williamson in the rise of TCE and in making its history. It was 
Williamson who built a theoretical bridge between neoclassical 
economics and Simon’s approach, but he did not offer a complete 
synthesis of these research traditions. 
The explanatory power of Williamsonian TCE lies essentially in the 
combination of the neoclassical logic of cost minimization (here: of 
transaction costs) with Simon’s emphasis on the effects of bounded 
rationality, i.e., “[...] it is only because individual human beings are 
limited in knowledge, foresight, skill, and time that organizations are 
useful instruments for the achievement of human purpose” (Simon 
1957a, 199). Therefore, TCE is situated at the intersection of economics 
and organization, and its contemporary development can be understood 
as a move from defining the firm as an avoider of negatives (i.e., of 
transaction costs, and other negative effects of bounded rationality) 
towards viewing the firm as a creator of positives. That move is due to 
the growing interest of economics in knowledge issues. 
Interestingly, that process has redirected the attention of TCE back 
towards Simon’s theory. Moreover, TCE has benefitted a lot from the 
recent developments in the cognitive sciences in which the firm has 
come to be seen as an important device for extending the cognitive 
capacity of individual economic agents. TCE may again play a crucial 
role in transforming modern economics just as it did in the 1970s, and 
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the second cognitive turn in TCE may make that approach a real 
synthesis of neoclassicism and modern organizational theory (Dugger 
1983, 111). Consequently, the second cognitive turn in TCE may in the 
near future appear as a cognitive turn not only in TCE, but in economics 
as a whole. 
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